














































































































































































































































erich 等（2002）基于英国市场、Dymke 和 Walter（2008）基于德国市场、Huang 和 Trezevant（2003）基于东南亚市场、Gruces 和
Kawamura（2005）基于拉美地区、史永东和蒋贤锋（2004）基于中国市场的实证研究都表明内幕交易均能获取超常收益。
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PINi,t = β0 + β1 IPi + β2PBCi + β3PBCi × IPi +∑
i=1
6
βi+3CVi,t +( fixed_effects) + εi,t （4）
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Abstract: This paper analyses the difference in the enforcement of law across firms under a country’s same legal system, and
explores the effect of this difference on the efficiency of insider trading regulation. This study constructs the firm micro-level
index in the enforcement of law on the basis of the Chinese listed companies’replies to the questionnaire by the securities reg-
ulatory commission, and measures the level of insider trading through calculating the probability of informed trading paper
based on the high frequency data. The evidence shows that with the severe enforcement of legal protection, the efficiency of in-
sider trading regulation will be improved significantly, and the insider trading resulting from private benefit of control is great-
ly reduced.
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